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Title of Thesisi Optimal Mix of Ammunition Inventory and
Production Capacity.
Name of Candldatei Louis Baerlswyl, Jr.
Master of Arts, 1968
Thesis directed byi Clopper Almon, Jr.
Edward Morrison
What is the optimal mix of ammunition inventory and
production capacity to meet mobilization requirements for a
new ammunition item? This thesis presents an economic model
to answer this question. Noteworthy features of this model
includei
(1) The discounting of the cost stream associated with
the optimal mix,
(2) An optimization that includes costs currently
omitted in mobilization planning, namely, inventory storage
and handling costs,
(3) The introduction of a quick reaction production
capacity as a possible alternative to facilities with normal
production lead times, and
(*+) An extension of the mobilization planning horizon
to the estimated end of a general war rather than only to
that time when production output first equals expenditures.
The model is used to identify the optimal mix for a
hypothetical 105mm high explosive howitzer round about to be

Introduced Into the Inventory. Inputs consisted of hypo-
thetical fixed and variable costs of production and storage,
an ammunition expenditure profile, a fixed minimum ammuni-
tion level to Tieet the requirements for preposltloned
ammunition and pipeline stocks, two production lead times,
and a variety of general war scenarios.
The thesis shows thati
(1) The choice of the discounting interest rate signi-
ficantly changes the optimal mix of ammunition inventory and
production capacity; and
(2) The ability to swing Into production quickly can
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Prior to initially searching for a suitable thesis
subject, I decided to find and work on the solution of an
actual defense problem, rather than a finger exercise.
The problem had to allow me to demonstrate that I could
apply new knowledge gained during the 13 month Defense
Education Program course. The problem of determining the
optimal mix of ammunition inventory and production capacity
was undertaken because:
(1) It is a current defense problem of considerable
importance involving substantial amounts of money.
(2) It is an economic problem that appeared to be
amenable to solution by the techniques taught during the
course.
(3) It is a problem that interested me because of my
experience with ammunition expenditure rates in a Marine
Corps study of ammunition logistics.
I initially expected to work on a problem that con-
cerned my own service directly rather than on one in which
the Marine Corps has only to establish its own end-product
requirements. Had I undertaken a Marine Corps problem, I
wculd have saved time by obtaining information in a familiar
environment. But, fortunately, I had the generous assis-
tance of U.S Army personnel and Department of Defense
civilians on this thesis problem.

ill
The originality of the proposed solution stems In part
from my not having been in close contact with the currently
used planning technique. A fresh look was possible. At
the same time, this lack of any real experience in the
difficult work of ammunition procurement may have caus d me
to overlook important aspects of the problem. If there a^e
such shortcomings, I naturally assume full responsibility
for them.
It is hoped that this work will receive the careful
attention of defense planners and that the proposed model
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by simplifying the model that is the heart of this thesis
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text.
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B. Organization of Thesis.
DESCRIPTION OF MODEL
A. Mathematical Model for Solution of
Optimal Mix.
B. Simple Inventory and Production
Capacity Model with Three Constraint
Equations.
C. Refinement of Sinmle Model by Expan-
sion of Storage Cost Component.
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When a war starts, the pressing demand for ammunition
must be met initially from inventory. After some delay,
production begins to meet the demand. The quicker produc-
tion can start, the smaller inventory has to be. But a
quick start requires that production capacity be kept ready.
Both inventory and production readiness are expensive, but
what is the optimal mix between the two?
This thesis presents an economic model for answering
that question. The results of the model strongly suggest
that we are presently spending more on inventory and less on
capacity than we should. They also show that the choice of
the discounting interest rate significantly changes the
optimal mix of ammunition inventory and production capacity.
B. Organization of Thesis
This thesis is divided into four chapters. The first
is a brief introduction followed by the description of the
evolved economic model. The third chapter shows and dis-
cusses the resulting optimal mixes obtained by applying
input data for a hypothetical 105mrr howitzer round and





A. Mathematical Model for Solution of Optimal Mix.
A mathematical model of simultaneous linear equations
was built to identify the least-cost mix of ammunition
inventory, I, and of the production capacity of two plants,
P and P
? .
P-, is a plant that can start production quickly;
P. Is a plant n ln moth balls". The model solves for the
optimal mix of inventory and production capacity for a new
Item of ammunition to meet general war requirements. The
horizon of this model extends to the end of a hypo thetical
general war. It includes all ammunition costs for the war
for this item. All solutions provide the same benefit, I.e.,
satisfy war requirements for this ammunition item, so that
the least cost solution Is optimal.
The model is explained in three steps. First, a
simple model of an objective function - cost equation of
the I, P
n
and V mix - to be minimized and three constraint
equations forms a departure point. Next, the model Is
refined by expanding the storage cost component in
terms of the I, P and P variables. Finally, the cost
equation is farther refined by discounting the cost stream
associated with the mix. Specific values for coefficients
are discussed and identified in Appendix 1. However, co-
efficients are defined as they are lndtroduced.

Two examples are used to introduce the simple model
and its first refinement. These are shown in the ammuni-
tion inventory profile in Figure 1, The abscissa of this
figure is a time scale in months. Zero time is the time
when the production of the initial inventory starts. A
war is assumed to start at time tQ and end at time t^ t so
that the length of the war is t«-t months. The preceding
period of peace is (tQ-0) or just t^ months. The ammuni-
tion expenditure rate E and production capacities P-, and
P are average rates that are constant with time. Either
of the two plants can be in the optimal mix and produce
ammunition at their rated capacity P^ or P . The first
plant can respond quickly to a production order and produces
at full capacity P starting at time t only (t1-tQ ) months
after the start of the war; the slower responding second
plant starts producing at full capacity P2 at time t ? which
is (tp-t ) months after the start of the war.
The amount of ammunition inventory at any time is
shown by the ordinate of Figure 1, usually given in units
1
of thousands of rounds. In Example A, the initial inven-
tory is I. with the normal response production facility pro-
ducing with an output rate of Pp. A minimum cost solution
1 Thousands of rounds Is abbreviated as K rds subse-
quently in the text, tables and figures. Production





for the mix of I. and P is illustrated by the constant in-
ventory line from time t to tA , The inventory is reduced
e
from I. at time t to F at t_ as a result of combat exoendi-
A 2
tures. The decline would continue if the normally respond-
ing plant did not start to produce at time t . The P
production capacity just equals the expenditure rate E, so
that the Inventory is not reduced below the fixed minimum
ammunition level, F, during the balance of the war. Note
that the initial inventory IA was just large enough so that
ib was not reduced below F during the normal response of
(tp-t ) months. A possible minimum cost solution for this
simple example would be one where the production capacity
P just equals the expenditure rate E. The slope of the
ammunition inventory line between tQ and t equals the
expenditure rate E, which in this case equals the negative
of the slope of the produced ammunition line Pp.
Example B illustrates the same situation, except that
a quick response facility has replaced the normally respond-
ing plant as a possible minimum cost solution. This quick
reaction plant, with capacity P also equal to the expendi-
ture rate E, starts producing (tp-t.. ) months sooner than the
normal response plant. The result Is a reduction in inven-
tory between the two examples, namely, ^a-Ir*
From this example, we see the quick response plant
makes a smaller inventory (I n ) adequate. The reduced inVen-
tory costs may well outweigh the high costs of providing and
maintaining the rulck response plant.

B. Simple Inventory and Production Capacity Model with
Three Constraint Equations.
The simple model Includes an objective function that Is
a cost equation for the inventory and production capacity.
Three constraint equations require that the Initial inven-
tory plus produced output be equal to or greater than the
fixed minimum ammunition level plus ammunition expended to
each of three times, i.e., when the quick and normal produc-
tion facilities each start producing, and when the war ends.
There are also three non-negative side conditions for the
Initial inventory and the two production capacities.
The three constraint equations aret
(1) I > F + E(t
1
-t )
(2) I + <W^ ^ F + E(t 2~ t )














, P^O , P^O t
where
t
I - Initial ammunition inventory level in 1000 rounds.
P - Ammunition production capacity (rate) for quick re-
1 action facility In 1000 rounds per month commencing
at t
.
P- - Ammunition production capacity (rate) for normal re-
action facility in 1000 rounds per month commencing at
v
F - Fixed minimum ammunition level in 1000 rounds.
E - Estimate of mean combat expenditure rate of item of
ammunition in 1000 rounds per month.
t - Time in months with zero reference at time that initial
inventory is started..

t - Time it takes to produce Initial inventory.
t« - Time ammunition expenditure is initiated; start of war.
t - Time quick reaction production facility starts pro-
ducing.
t- - Time normal reaction production facility starts pro-
ducing.
t - Time ammunition expenditure is terminated; end of war.
The three constraints are basically the same. The
left hand side represents available ammunition, while the
right hand side identifies the requirements for ammunition.
In general, the initial inventory plus any quantity produced
to the time considered, i.e., (t-t^JP., must be equal to or
greater than the fixed minimum ammunition level plus the
combat expenditures to that same time, i.e., E(t-tQ ). The
first constraint requires that the initial inventory be
greater than or equal to the fixed minimum ammunition level
plus the ammunition expended from the start of the war until
the quick reaction production facility (P, ) starts produc-
ing at t , i.e., plus E(t -t ) The second and third con-
straints specify this same relationship at times t
?
and t~,
except that the third constraint equation is an equality as
no excess inventory is wanted above F at time t . These
constraints can be visualized by examining the ordinates of
Figure 1 at times t , t and t .12 3
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The below cost equation, appropriate to the development
of the simple model at this point, is composed of three
major cost elements. The first element is associated with
the procurement and storage costs of the Initial ammunition
inventory. The last two elements relate to the fixed and
variable costs of the two types of production facilities.







i;(At )lJ + [a1+ait (VO) +b1 (t3-t1 )]pi







C - Total cost of satisfying ammunition requirements for a
general war in dollars.
a^- Initial inventory procurement cost coefficient in
dollars per 1000 rounds.

















(2) I + (tg-^^ > F + E(t 2-t )
Adding (3") and (2):
I + (t^t.^ + t 2P1 + t 3P2 >F + E(t3-t Q ) + E(t 2 )













-t1 )P1 + (t 3-t 2 )P >F + E(t3-tQ ) which can be
changed to an equality to preclude an excess of inventory
at t~.

a - Receiving costs coefficient for the one time handling
r of the initial inventory when placed in and removed
from storage in dollar per 1000 rounds.
a - Storage costs coefficient associated with Initial
inventory in dollars per 1000 rounds - months.
a. - Fixed cost coefficient of building the quick reaction
capacity, i.e., for plant, equipment and long lead
time components, in dollars per 1000 rounds per month
production capacity.
a - Fixed cost coefficient of maintaining the quick re-
action facility that is a function of time prior to
the start of production, e.g., plant and equipment
maintenance costs, long lead time component storage
costs, employee training costs, in dollars per 1000
rounds
.
b, - Variable cost coefficient of production from quick
reaction production facility in dollars per 1000
rounds.
a2
- Fixed cost coefficient of building the normal reaction
capacity In dollars per 1000 rounds per month produc-
tion capacity.
a - Fixed cost coefficient of maintaining the normal re-
action facility that is a function of time prior to
the start of production in dollars per 1000 rounds.
b« - Variable cost coefficient of production from normal
reaction production facility in dollars per 1000
rounds.
I i - Average inventory during time phase
<fi
in 1000 rounds.
At. - Time period for storage phase 4 in months.
The three cost elements of the above cost equation, i.e.,
those related to I, P_ and P , will be examined In turn.
The inventory cost element, (Cost A) I, consists of
three components! (1) the cost of procuring the inventory,
(2) a handling cost, and (3) a storage cost. The cost of
procuring the initial inventory is the unit cost of the
ammunition times the size of the inventory, namely, a I.
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The initial inventory is produced in the same plant
which is in the optimal mix and subsequently provides the
mobilization base. As there is ordinarily no urgency to the
production of the initial inventory, compared to 'fleeting
Lrflffiecllate ooiibat requirements, the cost of the initial in-
ventory should be based upon the lower costs of the normal
response plant rather than the quick response plant. The
cost coefficients of production facility with capacity P?
are applicable to the production of the initial inventory.
Even if the quick response plant produces the initial aranu-
nition inventory, its extra personnel training costs, and
long lead time ammunition component costs to provide the
quick response are not applicable charges against the
initial inventory. Thus, the initial inventory procurement
costs is based on b even though the inventory may be pro-
duced by either type plant. Thus, b~ is substituted for a
in the cost equation (in Cost A),
When ammunition is placed In a storage site, there is a
one time handling cost which is not incurred when ammunition
is moved directly to a port of embarkation, and thence to a
combat area. This cost is proportional to the amount of
ammunition stored, i.e., the inventory. The extra handling
cost equals a one time handling cost coefficient (a ) times
the size of the inventory (I).
While the inventory is stored, costs are Incurred which
are a function of both the storage period and the size of
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the stored Inventory. These storage costs cover the
operation and maintenance of the storage site, e.g., securi-
ty service, fire protection, and maintenance of storage
bunkers. The total storage cost is equal to a composite
storage cost coefficient, a , times the number of months
s
the ammunition Inventory is in storage, At. , times the average
number of rounds stored furing that period, 1^. The stor-
age cost will be further explained and expanded in the
next refinement of the model. A.t this point, the costs
3directly related to the inventory will be represented asi
(Cost A) I = [~(b?+ajl + a £Ut.)T,
I * r s r P-
The costs associated with both type production facili-
ties have the same form. There are three components in
both of these cost elements. The first component, a, (P,)
is the fixed cost of the production facility including the
fixed costs for plant, equipment, tools, and the procure-
ment cost of any long lead time ammunition components that
are required to permit a quick response to a production
order. This fixed cost is divided by the capacity of the
plant so that the dimension of a is dollars per 1000
rounds of output per month. The second cost component,
a_ (t,-0)P. , is the maintenance cost of retaining the quick
3 The expression (Cost A) is not correct in detail as
Ta is a function of the variables I, P-^ and P2 . This ex-
pression is used in the simple model only to permit the early




production facility In a high state of readiness. Such
costs are a function of the length of time the plant is
held in readiness and the size of the plant, I.e., produc-
tion capacity. These costs include the normally required
maintenance of the production facility and the extra train-
ing of the labor force necessary to provide the quick re-
action capability. The third cost component is the vari-
able cost of producing ammunition, b (t -t )P , from the
highly responsive plant during the hypothetical war. The
coefficient b has dimensions of dollars per 1000 rounds.













The cost components of the production capacity of
the slower reacting plant, I.e., the normal response facili-
ty with capacity P
2 ,
are of the same type as those for P,
.
However, the time phasing of these latter costs and values
for some individual coefficients are different. The costs
of the normal response plant can be represented asi
(Cost C)P2 = [a2+a2t (t2-0)+b2 (t 3-t2 ) |P2
The linear programming tableau for the simple model is«
(Cost A)I + (Cost E)P
1
+ (Cost C)P = COST
I + (t„-t n )P
> F + Eftj-t,,)
p
l
> F + E(t 2-t )
pl
+ P2 = E





C. Refinement of Simple Model by Expansion of Storage
Cost Component,
The storage cost component, a J2{&t,)I,, must be ex-
panded to represent the cost for each of the <p storage
phases. Since storage costs are a function of the amount
of inventory stored, it is necessary to identify the mean
inventory of each phase, X. , in terras of the variables of
the model. The five mean Inventory levels are obtained by
averaging the Inventory at the beginning and end of each
phase. These beginning and end point inventories are il-









The average Inventory for each phase Is identified as T .
These averages can be quantified in terms of the initial








11 = i - (E/ax^-tQ)
1 2
= I - (E/2)
1
3
= I - (E/2)
+ (P^JCtg-ti)(ti-toMtJJ-to)
<t2-t )+(t3-t )J
+ (P/2)[(t2-t1 ) + (t3-t1 )]+ (P2/2)(t 3-t2 )
The storage cost can then be written asi
£UW ^{(Voftl + tto-teJl+CVto) [l-(E/2)(t 1-t )]














-t1 ) + (t3
-t
1
)]+(P2/2)(t 3-t 2 )]}
The revised cost equation and constraints provides the basis
for the undiscounted model shown below.
4 The terms could have been separated by variables I,
P-j_, P2 and a constant. This was not done as the discount-ing or the cost stream (done in the next paragraph) re-










I * (t2-t1 )P1
> F + EU^)









D. Refinement of Model by Discounting the Cost Stream.
The various components of the evolved cost equation
are incurred at different times. Investment costs are dis-
counted from the start of the month during which they are in-
curred. Similarly, recurring costs, e.g., inventory storage
costs, and plant maintenance costs, were discounted monthly
at the start of each month using an annual interest rate of
r. Four selected annual interest rates (r) that the govern-
ment now uses or perhaps ought to use for investment de-




The magnitude and time phasing of costs of an optimal
mix including a normal or quick response facility are
different. Figure 3 illustrates this difference by the
cost profiles for an I and P-, and I and P_ mix by the
upper and lower set of two profiles, respectively. The
time of the occurrence of critical events is shown on the
abscissa of the bottom profile. The abscissas are co-
incident but not to scale j nor are the ordinates to scale.
The cost profiles illustrate the time phasing of costs
associated with the two possible optimal mix examples in
Figure 1,
The choice of discounting interest rate can alter the
optimal mix. Consider the illustration of the I and P_
mix cost profiles with large expenditures deferred until
the war starts, while the I and P2 mix incurs large costs
for a larger inventory early in the period of peace, './e
might expect the I and P~ mix to be optimal at a low dis-
counting interest rate. At some increased interest rate
the deferred large expenditures associated with the I and P_
mix would be so heavily discounted that this latter mix
could become optimal.
Does such a change of the optimal mix from a normal to
a quick response plant occur at a discounting interest rate
within the range of those used by government decision








COST PROFILE OF U P MIX
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d - Monthly discount rate expressed as a decimal}
l+(r/12)
r - Annual interest rate used for discounting expressed as
a decimal.
m - Period of time over which discounting occurs in months,
P - Cost incurred "m" months from the present time in
m dollars.
P - Discounted present cost in dollars.
A - Cost incurred monthly at the start of each month ex-
m pressed in dollars.
S - Discounted present cost, in dollars, of a sum of equal
om monthly costs, A
.
These two basic discounting formulas are applied to the
previous cost equation and the resulting terms are collected
by variables I, P , and P and remaining constants as shown
on the next page.
5 Excellent treatments on discounting cost streams are
found ins (1) Abert, James G. f Structuring Cost Effectiveness
Analysis . Logistic Review & Military Logistics Journal,
Vol.11, No. 7, 1966, pp 26-28, (2) Niskanen, A Suggested
Treatment of Time-Distributed Expenditures in Defense Systems
Analysis
. Internal Note N-396 (R)t Institute for Defense
Analysis, 17 October 1966, p. 4.
6 Baumol, Will lam J., Economic Theory and Operations












































































































































Appendix 2 contains a discount table as a function of
time and selected interest rates used with this model.
E. Linear Program Tableau.
The linear program tableau of the discounted model is
shown below.
(Cost A 1 )I+(Cost BMP-j + CCost C*)P
2




I + (tg-t-^P-L > F+E(t
2
-t )
and I>0, P >0 t P2>0.
F. Inputs.
The inputs used with the model are discussed and





SUMMARY TABULATION OF INPUTS USED WITH ECONOMIC MODEL
Discounting Interest ratei
r = 0.001, 0.0^, 0.10 and 0.15.
Ammunition expenditure ratei
E = 750,000 rounds per month.
Fixed Minimum Ammunition Level:






Length of preceding period of peace:
t = 60, 120 and 2^0 months.
Response time of production facilities, for quick-reaction
plant:
t -t = 0.25 month,
and, normal reaction plant:
t -t„ = 6 months
o
Length of time to produce the initial inventory:




- $137,500. /K rds/rno
a-.= $2^4, /K rds
b = $25,000. /K rds
a, = $89,000, /K rds/mo
a = £1^9.30 /K rds
h2 = $25,000. /K rds
a
..
= $200. /K rds




Although the model has been shown in the linear pro-
gramming tableau, the optimal mix can be determined graphi-
cally using the discounted cost equation, three constraints,
and side conditions, i.e.,
C03TD = (Cost A» )I + (Cost BMP-, + (Cost C 1 )P + (Cost K* )
(1) I > ^,187.5
(2) I + 5.75 Px > 8,500
(3M P-L + P2 = 750.
and I>0, P >0, P >0.
1 2
Before solving for the variables, the model will be
further simplified by eliminating one variable, P2 , and re-
ducing the model to two variables. Solving the third con-
straint for P_,
P = 750 - P,
2 1
and substituting this into the cost equation givesi
C0STD = (Cost AMl+(Cost B 1 JP^Cost C» ) ( 750-P )+( Cost K').





(Cost B« ) - (Cost C )"
(Cost A 1 )
P-j_ = minimum
> ^,187.5




The impact of a change in the discounting interest rate
on the optimal mix can be illustrated by plotting the two
constraints in Figure 4. The first is a horizonal line with
I = 4,187.5 K rds? the second is a straight line from
I = 8,500 K rds on the inventory axis (point B) to 1.48
million rounds per month on the P, axis. The intersection
1
of these two constraints is labeled point A, The binding
constraints and side condition, P >0, are shown by the red
line segments on Figure 4,
The I and P mix constant cost lines for a discounting
interest rate of 0.1, 4.0, 10 and 15 percent and t = 60
months situation are drawn in Figure 4 from data in Table
2. With all other inputs fixed, the slope of the I and P
mix constant cost lines increase as the discounting interest
rate increases. Since the slope of the constraint line
A - E is — 5 • 75 » "the constant cost lines with a slope greater
than — 5 • 75 are tangent to the feasible set at point A.
Those constant cost lines with a slope less than -5*75 are
tangent to the feasible set at point 3.
The constant cost lines for a discounting interest rate
of 10 and 15$ (tangent at point A identify an optimal mix of
4,l87t500 rounds of inventory and a quick reaction plant
with a capacity of 750,000 rounds per month. If the chosen
discounting interest rate were 0.1 or 4.0$, the constant
cost line for the I and P mix would be tangent at point B.
This identifies*
P = K rds/mo and
1
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P? = 750 - P.. t the optimal mix for these two lower
discounting interest rates is a significantly larger in-
ventory of 8.5 million rounds and a normal response plant
(P ) with a capacity of 750,000 rounds per month.
The impact of a change in the discounting interest rate
is shown by the counterclockwise rotation of the constant
cost lines (i.e., increased slope) as the interest rate is
increased. If the slope of the constant cost line is less
than the slope of the constraint line "S - B, the optimal mix
isi
P = 750,000 rounds per month, and
2
I = 8,500,000 rounds;
if greater than the slope of the constraint line A - B, the
optimal mix includes a quick reaction facility and smaller
inventory oft
P = 750,000 rounds per month, and
I = ^,187,500 rounds.
The Cost A*, B* , C* and K 1 coefficients and the result-
ing discounted costs for both type mixes are shown in Table
2 for four interest rates and three lengths of peace.
Table 2 also shows that as the discounting interest
rate increases for each of the three values of t , the I and
P, mix replaces the I and ?2 m*x as the optimal mix. Even
for the short 60 month period of peace, a change in the
discounting interest rate from k% to 10$ causes the optimal
mix to change from a large inventory and normal response
plant to a significantly smaller inventory and quick response
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plant. This indicates that the high investment and mainten-
ance cost of the quick reaction facility have been Justified
by the reduced total cost resulting from reduced inventories.
The optimal mix changes at a lower discounting Interest
rate when the period of peace preceding the war is lengthen-
ed. Figure 5 and the data of Table 2 illustrates the im-
pact of the same four discounting Interest rates on the opti-
mal mix when the period of peace is lengthened from 60 to 2^0
months. The optimal mix changes from an I and P
?
mix to a
smaller inventory and quick reaction production plant ( P-^) mix
for a discounting interest rate between 0,1 and 4,0^,
The value of t -t (the difference in the production lead
time of the normal and quick reaction plants) is critical for
determining which type mix will be optimal. The production
lead times have been examined in a coarse way with only two
alternatives used in the model, i.e., P„ or P . A finer
1 2
grain examination of this critical parameter and its
associated cost seems warranted as a future effort.
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A. It is concluded thatt
1. The choice of the discounting interest rate
significantly changes the optimal mix of ammunition in-
ventory and production capacity; and
2. The ability to swing into production quickly
can justify high investment and maintenance costs for





A. Unclassified and Hypothetical Data.
The model built for this thesis is In a general form
applicable to any new item of ammunition. Specific input
data is needed. The 105mm high explosive howitzer round is
used as an illustrative example as it is so common that
combat expenditures, production techniques and production
costs can be accepted more readily than if the ammunition
item were strange. Also, since the 105mm howitzer round
has been in the Inventory for a long time, there is avail-
able more unclassified information than would otherwise be
the case. All of the input data used Is unclassified.
Where the actual data is classified, clearly hypothetical
situations have been posed. For example, the scenario for
general war includes the commitment of U.S. forces to com-
bat. This commitment is arbitrarily based on phasing 20
divisions into combat over an eight month period to deter-
mine an average expenditure rate. All inputs for which
references are not cited are hypothetical. The cost para-
meters are either drawn from unclassified government sources
or are hypothetical. The solutions provided by the model
for the optimal inventory and production capacity mixes




B. Type of Parameters.
It is useful to regard the input parameters as either
technical or subjective parameters, for the purpose of
discussing them. Technical parameters are those which
are based on relatively certain economic or engineering in-
formation. These parameters can be quantified with a small
variance and are not a matter of individual judgements and
interpretations. Examples of technical parameters used in
the model are all cost coefficients for the investment in
inventory and production capacity, and storage, handling,
maintenance and employee training costs. The responsive-
ness, i.e., production lead time, of a proposed production
facility is a technical parameter that can be identified.
The appropriate discounting interest rate for government
use is actually a technical parameter that can be identi-
fied from information on the opportunity cost of capital
1
in the private sector. This thesis reviews the extent to
which departments and agencies of the Federal government
discounted cost streams and what interest rate was used for
making investment decisions. The range of values used might
lead to the impression that the discounting interest rate
is a subjective judgement. Rather, its wide range stems
from a lack of a coherent, consistent policy to set an
appropriate rate.
1 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Planning -




Subjective parameters are based almost entirely on
the informed judgement of knowledgeable decision makers, or
are such that an arbitrary value will suffice. Subjective
parameters are such that a wide range of values would be
proposed for a specific situation. Decision makers may be
expected to have widely different views of what a future
general war will be like because of the many related im-
ponderables. The variance in scenarios, for example,
generates a wide range of values for ammunition expenditure
rates and fixed minimum ammunition levels to provide for
initial equipping of combat units, prepositloned stocks,
pipeline stockage and Initial combat expenditures.
When the next war will occur and how long it will last
are also subjective judgements which the decision maker
must render to realistically interpret mobilization re-
quirements. These estimates are Important because of the
effect bhey have on discounting costs that are deferred for
a long period and as the length of the war bears directly
upon the amount of ammunition expended.
There is a final subjective parameter, i.e., the
length of time during which the initial inventory is pro-
duced. The size of the inventory and the assumed minimum
time to produce it identifies the initial production capa-
city. This capacity is provided by using the mobilization
base at some fraction of its full output rate. Within this
output of three eight hour shifts a day, seven days a
week, there is a wide choice of lesser outputs that can
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produce economically, e.g., one eight hour shift, five days
a week.
Even fine Judgement, substantial knowledge and perfect
information of current conditions can only lead to plans
that anticipate, not predict, what might be needed to meet
mobilization requirements. The imponderables of the prob-
lem and tenuous character of some inputs should make it
clear that any plan may prove to be wide of the mark.
C. Selection of Interest Rate for Discounting Government
Investment Decision.
The technique of discounting a stream of returns or
costs is widely accepted. Most basic economics texts in-
clude a section on discounting and explain its Impact on
2,3
making investment decisions. It is generally concluded
that "opportunity" costs should be the basis for determining
the discounting interest rate. It appears that the use of
2 Samuelson, Paul A., Economics i An Introductory Analy-
sis. Sixth Edition , pp. 58*4-588.
3 Baumol, William J., Economic Theory and Operations
Analysis , pp. 422-^70.
k Interest and discount rate are often used inter-
changeably to mean the annual interest rate at which future
returns or costs are discounted. However, the discount rate
is uniformly defined asiD=l/(l+R) , where D is the discount
rate and R is the annual interest rate. This incorrect
interchangeable usage is usually understood by the context
of its use. Unfortunately, some reference to a "higher" or
"lower" discount rate rather than interest rate can and does
lead to confusion. Baumol^ after carefully defining dis-
count rate in the usual way (p. 422), proceeds to misuse it
in the following chapter (p.44o). To avoid possible con-
fusion, reference is only made to the "interest rate" used
for discounting which is called the "discounting Interest
rate" throughout this text.
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discounting for investment decisions is relatively new. A
cursory examination of the literature reveals numerous
articles published in economic journals in the late 1950'
s
5,6,7
and early 1960*s. Several authors have objectively
examined the question of what discounting interest rate is
appropriate for the Federal government in making investment
decisions. The more sophisticated authors have concluded
that none of the three traditional devices used for setting
the level of the discounting interest rate are appropriate.
The rate of return on the marginal private investment, the
national time preference, and the Interest rate at which the
government can borrow long-term funds were each examined and
discarded by E, B, Berman.
Hitch and KcKean discuss discounting and concluded
that, "the rate the government had to pay to borrow funds
... on the order of 3 percent , ... is a suitable mlnl-
8
mum rate". The Joint Economic Committee of the U.^.
Congress has taken a specific interest in urhat discounting
5 Hirshleifer, J., On the Theory of Optimal Investment
Decisions . The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. No. 4,
August, 1958, pp. 329-352.
6 Dickson, R, Russell, Jr., How Dlscounted-Cash-Flow
Analysis Reshapes Capital Programs . Business Horizons,
Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring i960, pp. 85-90.
7. Berman, E.B., The Normative Interest Rate . P -1796.
The RAND Corp, all.
8 Hitch, Charles J. & Roland N. McKean, Economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age , p. 210.
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Interest rate should be applied to the government's Planning-
9
Programming-Budgeting System. In testimony before Con-
10
gress, Baumol, Stockfisch and otheis confirmed that oppor-
tunity cost in the private sector should be the basis for
the discounting interest rate used by the Federal govern-
ment. Dr. Stockfisch* s investigation indicated that the
average rate of return on "earnings assets" before taxes
for regulated and non-regulated Industries was 10$ and 15$
respectively, with a weighted average based on business in-
vestments on plant and equipment by year to be 13*7% before
taxes.
As a result of its hearings in 1967 and 1968, the Joint
Economic Committee identified the opportunity cost cf
capital in the private sector based on "earnings assets" as
the most relevant basis for the discounting interest rate.
It further identified the wide range of discounting interest
rates currently used in various departments and agencies of
the Federal government. A survey of the various departments
and agencies showed that there was no central guidance on
discounting. Of 29 departments and agencies queried, 10
reported that they not only did not currently apply dis-
counting to their investment decisions, but did not plan to
do so In the future. The Department of Defense, however,
• 9» U. S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Plann-
ing-Programming-Budgeting: System* Progress and Potentials .
December 1967, pp. 5-8.
10, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearing
before Sub-Committee on Economy in Government on September
14, 19, 20 & 21, 1967. The Plannlng-Programmlng-Budgeting
Systemt Progress and Potentials , pp. 129-179*
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does regularly use discounting in arriving at investment
decisions. Since the Department of Defense is among the
largest investors, it is probably correct to estimate that
one-half of the Federal government's major Investment
decisions are discounted. The Department of Defense fre-
quently uses 10$ as a discounting interest rate. Water
improvement projects have for a number of years been dis-
counted at an interest rate equal to that at which the
Federal government borrows money on fifteen year bonds.
In the past, such bonds have averaged 3 1/8$ to 3§$» An
interest rate of l\% has been widely used in discounting
investment projects for water conservation and land re-
clamation, and river and harbor projects. On the other
hand, the Labor Department in certain educational and
training programs (an investment in people) uses a one year
horizon as an alternate means of discounting, which is a
discounting interest rate of 100$.
Congressional interest has been focused on discounting
by President Johnson's directive of August 25» 19&5 estab-
lishing Planning, Programing and Budgeting System techni-
ques for all Federal agencies. The Joint Economic Committee,
in its report, concluded that a "discount rate . . . based on
opportunity cost in the private sector
. . . , and that the
discounting interest rate should be at least 10^ . . .
,
for Federal Investment decisions.
11 Same as 9# PP» 5 & 6»
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To illustrate the Impact of discounting on the optimal
mix, four discounting interest rates, i.e., 0.1, *K0, 10,
and 15 percent, were used as inputs in each of 3 situa-
tions. These values were used to illustrate! (1) the no
12
discounting case, approximated by 0.1 percent ; (2) a
value typically used in many of the departments and agencies
of the Federal government; (3) the loiter limit that the
Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress feels is appropri-
ate is 10$; and (**) the only upper limit knowledges bly sug-
13
gested which is 15$» The mechanics of discounting used in
the model precludes the use of a zero interest rate. A
zero discounting interest rate was approximated in the
model by the use of l/10th of 1%,
D. Ammunition Expenditure Rate.
The 105mm high explosive howitzer round was used as an
example in this thesis. It has been selected because it is
the most common U.S. artillery round and because of certain
desirable unclassified data that is available. The latter
12 This proxy was required as jdl <1 (pJ-8 ) is not
satisfied when the discounting interest rate is zero. The
divergence between zero and 0.1$ (and the other used values)
discounting interest rates is shown in the table of Appendix
2. I actually rediscovered this limitation of the summing
technique used when the test computer runs rejected zero
as an input for the discounting interest rate.
13 Stockfisch, J. A., The Interest Rate Applicable to
Government Investment Projects , prepared statement to the
Joint Economic Committee on September 20, 196?.
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permits the hypotheses of this thesis to be illustrated
with a "real example". The model may be applied to current
mobilization planning for any new round of ammunition by
introducing the classified ammunition production capacity
profile, ammunition expenditure profile and current cost
data.
The U.S. Army's individual weapon expenditure rates
are classified, while those of the U.S. Marine Corps are un-
classified. The Marine Corps uses an expenditure rate of
40.6 and 33 • 7 rounds per day per 105mm howitzer for
planning for the assault and extended operations ashore
14
phases, respectively. U.S. Army historical publications
on World War II and Korea give an excellent insight on all
types of ammunition expenditures. For example, in the
European theater between September 1944 and Kay 1945, ex-
penditure rates for the 105mm howitzer averaged 27.0 rounds
15
per tube per day. Peak expenditures, of course, exceeded
the average rates with a high monthly expenditure rate of
40.8 rounds per tube per day for this same caliber in July
of 1944.
It should be recognized that no tabulation of combat
expenditures serves as a reliable guide to actual ammunition
14 Marine Corps Order 8010. 1A Ch. 2; Subjects Class V
Logistical Procedure , p. 38 1 Table I.
15 Ruppenthal, Roland G. , Logistical Support of the




requirements. Ammunition of one type or another is usually
in short supply and is often rationed almost from the be-
ginning of an operation. This was the case within the first
week of the invasion of France because insufficient ammuni-
tion was being unloaded on the continent, and because of a
16
shortage of inland transportation. In Europe ammunition
rationing became the rule rather than the exception.
Further, average monthly expenditure rates will have
great variability depending oni (1) the organization of the
friendly and enemy forces, (2) the relative strength and
the missions of the opposing forces, (3) the immediate
terrain, (4) the weather, and even (5) the season of the
year. For example, two opposing forces on the same terrain,
in the same strength, and with all factors of the situation
unchanged, except the season of the year, will expend
different amounts of ammunition due solely to the differ-
ences in season. The fewer hours of daylight in the winter
reduces the number of firing missions as fewer targets are
observed, while more unobserved harrassing and interdiction
missions would be fired. Also, the longer hours of darkness
would entail the expenditure of more illuminating ammunition.
The tenuous nature of ammunition expenditure rates becomes
clear, when the least important of several variables can
make a significant difference in average monthly expenditure
rates.
16 Ruppenthal, Roland G. , Logistical Support of the
Armies. Vol. I> May 1941 - September 1944
. pp. 52 5 & 628.
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As inputs for the model, the time phased expenditure
rates have been approximated by a single (average) expendi-
ture rate, i.e., one straight line. Actually, the ammuni-
tion expenditure profile could be represented by a dis-
continuous curve of straight line segments. The model
can accommodate such a representation at the expense of
some added complexity. Instead of the right hand side of
the first three constraint equations being, in pert,
E (At), it would be necessary to substitute E (At )+E (At ),
where the two different expenditure rates apply during time
period At. , and At
,
respectively. This complexity is not
1 2
warranted when one considers the tenuous nature of the
17
average ammunition expenditure rate. Expenditure rates
come from scenarios to support national objectives and
strategic plans which, of necessity, are based upon assump-
tions that would be difficult to judge even if they did not
continue to change.
It is difficult for persons not familiar with
the task to appreciate the problems inherent in
such activltiesi the imponderables as to the enemy's
intentions and capabilities; the inability to anti-
cipate the area of probable employment of forces
and the nature of military tasks in war; the limi-
tations imposed by budgets and politics; the com-
plexities inherent in alliances; the appropriate
types and levels of equipment and standards of
support for units and individuals; the availability
of time for production after the onset of an emer-
gency; and the time needed to move units and equip-
ment to the theaters of combat. For all the strik-
ing advances in scientific analysis and In the use
of electronic devices, planning judgment will always
bulk large in the requirements equation. ^°
17 Archer, Harry Clarke, The Computation of Military
Materiel Requirements, pp. 72-73. 192.
18 Yoshpe, Harry B. , Requirements! Matching Needs with
Resources , p. 115*
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As inputs for the model, the 105mm howitzer expendi-
ture rate was assumed to be 50 rounds per tube per day
under conditions of intense combat and 25 rounds per tube
per day under conditions of sustained combat.
Figure 6 illustrates a hypothetical Profile of Engaged
Divisions showing the commitment of 20 U.S. divisions to
combat over an eight month period. It is further assumed
that a division committed to combat initially expend ammuni-
tion at intense combat rates for 15 days and thereafter at
sustained rates. The number of 105mm howitzers assigned per
division depends on the type of division, e.g., infantry,
mechanized-infantry, airborne, Marine. In the latter, there
are 76 of these howitzers. An input of 75 105mm howitzers
per division was used with the model.
These assumptions result in the hypothetical expendi-
ture of a total of 6,020 ,000 rounds in eight months, with
the calculation for each month being shown below Figure 6
.
This averages to 753t000 rounds per month, which was
rounded off to 750,000 rounds per month as the expenditure
rate used in this thesis. While this is a gross estimate,
it certainly should be acceptable within the broad range
of uncertainties connected with the general war scenario
and estimated expenditure rates per howitzer per day.
E, Fixed Minimum Ammunition Level.
The fixed minimum ammunition level, F, is e subjective
parameter. The selected value of F directly affects the
















The ammunition expended each month can be calculated as
shown.
Month Calculation Expended
1 (2)(75) [15(50) + 15(25)] -169,000
2 (2)(75)(30)(25) + 3(75)[15(50)+15(25)] -365,000
3 (5)(75)(30)(25) + 5(75)[15(50)+15(25)] -703,000
4 (10)(75)(30)(25) -563.000
5 (10)(75)(30)(25) + (5)(75)[15(50)+15(25)] -98^,000
6 (15)(75)(30)(25) -3W*,000




combat scenario Tor the conceived general war will have a
major Impact on prepositioned ammunition and on pipeline
stocks. These two elements of the fixed minimum ammunition
level have received considerable attention because of the
size of investment involved. Most work in this area has
concentrated on the management aspects of the ammunition in-
ventory. The size and location of prepositioned stocks, and
the size of the inventory to fill the pipeline are both
critically dependent on available transportation at the
19
time of the emergency. The enormous size of the pipeline,
i.e., quantity of ammunition to fill this need is better
appreciated by the . . . "estimate that by the end of the
war (World War II) only one half of the 21 million tons of
ammunition produced in the U.S. had been sent overseas and
20
less than one fourth actually had been expended". While
not a typical premobilization situation, it does help give
perspective to the problems of selecting a value for F.
A wide range of values for F are possible, dependent
as it is upon the Imponderables of the expected combat
theater, the theater's distance from the continental United
States, and the ability of the United States to deliver
ammunition and support obscure future combat operations.
Alternate means of transportation, e.g., air lift and sea
lift, and the availability of an adequate port and airfield
all bear on this problem.
19 Xoshpe, Harry B. , National Security Management, he-
qulrementst Matching Needs with Resources
.
pp. 6o-6?.
20 Smith, R. Elberton, United States Army in War II,
The Army and Economic Mobilization , p. 207.
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A single value for F was established for use In the
model on the following basis. Prepositioned ammunition
was set (hypothetical) at 120 days support for 10 divisions,
with the Initial 15 days of support at intense expenditure
rates (50 rounds/howitzer/day) and the balance at normal
(sustained) rates (25 rounds/howitzer/day). The authorized
pipeline is assumed to be 90 days long and to be able to
support 10 divisions at sustained rate. Therefore,
F = Prepositioned Ammunition + Pipeline Stocks
= [(10)(75)(15(50) + 105(25)} + [(10)(75)(90X25)]
2,531,250 + 1,687,500) rounds
F = 4,218,750 rounds.
21
This was rounded to F = 4,000 K rds for use as an input
to the model. While this 10 division pipeline doesn't match
the 20 divisions assumed to be committed by D+6 months, it
does meet the time requirements of the 10 divisions com-
mitted at D+90 days and provides a measure of safety in
meeting the estimated total expenditure of 6,020,000 rounds
in the first eight months of combat.
F. Length of War and Preceding Period of Peace.
A 36 month long war and three preceding periods of
peace were used as Inputs to the model. The three selected
values for the preceding period of peace are 60, 120 and
21 Thousands of rounds is abbreviated as K rds and
production capacity in thousands of rounds per month is
abbreviated as K rds/mo.
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2*1-0 months. The length of the peace, (t
-0), Is critics.!
to the selection of the optimal mix through the impact of
discounting the deferred war time production costs. How-
ever, (t -0) has no effect on the size of P. or P
.
G. Responsiveness of Production Facilities.
The quick and normal response facilities have assigned
response times of 0.25 Qnd 6 months, respectively. These
two selected values are more than an order of magnitude
apart. These response times apply to plants with unique
characteristics that are apparent from the discussion of
their respective cost coefficients.
H, Time It Takes to Produce the Initial Inventory.
The time period during which the initial inventory is
produced (t ), the size of the initial inventory (I) and
the production capacity used (P
n
) are related byi
e
For any given inventory, a larger PQ is required as the
time taken to produce the inventory is reduced. Unless
war is imminent, t Q is extended as long as possible so
that a part of the production base is kept in a high state
of readiness by being used. Efficient production will
impose some practical minimum output rate (PQ )» This
used capacity will not exceed that of the mobilization
base, P, or P , unless the initial inventory is required12
in a relatively short period of time.
As an input to this model, 12 months has been selected




expected for five years, rather than in 10 or 20 years.
A larger t would be more appropriate to a situation with
the latter two longer periods of peace.
I, Cost Inputs.
It was assumed that a new Army Ammunition Plant for the
production (i.e., loading, assembly, and packing) of 105mm
howitzer ammunition could be obtained for $56,000,000 for
all required construction (buildings, roads, and loading
docks), equipment and tools. Such a plant is further as-
sumed to have a capacity of 625,000 105mm howitzer rounds
per month (using three 8 hour shifts seven days a week).
If maintained as a mobilization base, it could produce at
full capacity with a production lead time of 6 months.
Therefore, the fixed cost coefficient for a normal re-
action capacity isi
a_ = f#i 000, 0QQ w $89, 000A rds/mo.2 625 K rds/mo
This normal response facility, when held in readiness
but not producing, will incur monthly costs for maintenance
of plant and leasing the property. These recurring fixed
costs are assumed to be 2 percent of the replacement
value of the plant, equipment, tools and any required long
lead time components as an annual cost. Thus, the value
for the fixed cost coefficient that is a function of time
for the normal reaction facility 1st




The variable cost of producing from the normal response
facilities is assumed to be $25,000/K rds. This unit





The costs related to the quick response facility
(those with subscript 1 on the coefficients) are the same
type as those for the slower responding plant. Recall that
we are again considering a new plant of the latest technolo-
gy in an industry not particularly suited for automation.
Thus, the improved responsiveness is achieved viai (1) the
stocking of long lead time components for the 105mm howitzer
round, including necessary packing materials, and (2) the
contractural arrangement for having a trained and experienc-
ed labor force available so that production at near full
capacity could be initiated in one week.
For a gross calculation of the Investment in long lead
time components, it was estimated that these components
would be valued at $8000 for each thousand finished rounds,
i.e., at a little less than one third of the variable cost.
If it is further assumed that long lead time components to
meet six months of full capacity output will be procured,
the added investment cost isi
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Added Investment Cost = (&8000/K rds)(625 K rds/mo)(6 mo.)
$30,000,000.
Thus,
a - ^6,OOO,O0Qffl0,O0O,OOO . #137f50oA rds/mo.x 0^3 K. rds/mo
Several assumptions had to be made to estimate the per-
sonnel training costs to achieve a quick response. It was
assumed thati
(1) A contract could be negotiated with a company,
located in the same community as this Army Ammunition Plant,
to cross-train the necessary fraction of their personnel for
loading, assembly and packing operations in the quick
response plant and to operate that plant,
(2) A labor force of 2,500 persons is required and,
(3) A period of 40 hours of cross-training is required
by each member of the labor force to achieve the desired
qui ok re s pons e
.
Also, bearing on the cross-training costs are the
current average hourly earnings and labor separation rate
for ammunition workers „ Gross hourly earnings of $3*30/
22
hour and a separation rate of 2.9 percent/month were used.
Thus, annual training costs were calculated to bei
22 Bureau of Labor Statistic, U.S. Department of Labor,
Employment and Earnings and Monthly Report on the Labor Force .




Annual training costs = (2,500 men)(*K) hr/3yr) ($3.30 man hr)
= $110,000/yr.
Monthly training cost per K rds/mo. = -, (fal?iQQQZj.r) ,—
_
(12 mo/yr)(625 K rds/mo)
= |14.67/K rds«$15./K rds
Annual maintenance costs are higher on the quick re-
sponse facility than the normal one because of the additional
$30,000,000 investment in long lead time components. These
components incur monthly storage costs which are aggregated
under the previously used 2 percent of the present value as
an annual maintenance cost. Thus, the monthly maintenance
cost per K rds/mo. isi
( .02/yr) (#86,000, 000)/(625 K rds/mo) (12 mo/yr) = $229. /K rds
Them
a = $229. /K rds + $15A rds - $2*J4/K rds.
The variable cost of production for bhe quick and
normal reaction facilities are the same since the material
and labor costs are assumed to be equal. Thus,
b = b = $25,000/K rds.
Storage cost data was obtained from the Army Ammunition
and Procurement Supply Agency at Joliet, Illinois, Annual
ammunition storage costs were given as $2.2^ per ton - year
with a separate one time handling (receiving) cost of
$6.67/ton. The complete 105mm howitzer round (packed two to
a box) weighs 60 pounds per round.
Therefore, the monthly storage cost coefficient and receiv-
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ing cost coefficient arei
a = (|2.2Vton-yr)(60 lb/rd)(l ton/2000 lb)
s X(1000 rds/K rd)(l yr/12 mo)
= $5. 60A rds-mo.
and
a = ($6.67/ton)(6o lb/rd)(l ton/2000 lb) (1000 rd/K rd)
r
$200. /K rds.
The cost coefficients applied to the model arei
a = 1137.500. A rds/mo
a = $2kk. /K rds
-Lb
b = $25,000. /K rds
a~ = $89,000. A rds/mo
a2t= tfl^9.3<d A rds










PRESENT VALUE OF $100. DISCOUNTED MONTHLY
A3 A FUNCTION OF ANNUAL INTEREST iiATE AMD TIME IN MONTI'S
Time Discountinp- In t ere st Rate in Percent
in
months 0.1 4 10 15
i 9.99 $99.,67 $99..17 *98. 17
2 .98 99..34 98,.35 97, 55
3 .98 99.,01 97..5^ 96<.3^
4 .97 98,,68 96,.73 95..15
5 .96 98,.35 95.94 93< 98
6
.95 98,,02 95.,14 92, 82
7 o9^ 97,.70 9^.^ 91. 67
8
.93 97,.37 93..58 90..54
9 .93 97,.05 92,,80 89. 42
10 o92 96<.73 92,,04 88,.32
11 .91 96,,41 91.,28 87,
12 .90 96,.09 90,,52 86, 15
13 J/ 95.,77 89,,77 85« 09
14 .88 95.M 89<.03 84,,04
15 .88 95..13 83,.30 83. 00
24 .80 92,.32 81,,9^ ?4,
36 .70 88,.71 74,.17 63. 04
-'+8
.60 85.,24 67,,14 c.5> (>
60 o50 81,.90 60, 78 47, 46
90 .25 74,,12 47..38 32, 69
120 \' oOl 67.,08 36,,94 .52
180 98.5: 5^.,9^ 22
,
M 10, 69
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